Education and the welfare gains from employment protection

In this paper, we generalize the study of the return to education undertaken in e.g. Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995) or Burdett and Smith (2002) to an environment where the link between education and employment stability is taken into account. This enables us to study how an European-like and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) with heavily regulated long-term contracts and more flexible short-term contracts affects the return to schooling, equilibrium unemployment and welfare. In this context, we show that ¯ring costs and temporary employment have opposite effects on the rate of use of human capital and thus, on educational investments. We furthermore demonstrate that a laissez faire economy with no regulation is inefficient as it is characterized by insufficient educational investments leading to excess job destruction and inadequate job creation. By stabilizing employment relationships, firing costs may spur educational investments and therefore lead to welfare and productivity gains, though a first-best policy would be to subsidize education. However, there is little chance for a dual (European-like) EPL to raise the incentives to schooling and aggregate welfare.human capital; job destruction; matching frictions; efficiency

Education and the Welfare Gains from Employment Protection

This paper studies the impact of an European-like labor market regulation on the return to schooling, equilibrium unemployment and welfare. We show that firing costs and temporary employment have opposite effects on educational choices. We furthermore demonstrate that a laissez faire economy with no regulation is inefficient as it is characterized by insufficient educational investments leading to excess job destruction and inadequate job creation. By stabilizing employment relationships, firing costs may spur educational investments and therefore lead to welfare and productivity gains, though a first-best policy would be to subsidize education. However, there is little chance for a dual labor market, as is common in many European countries, with heavily regulated long-term contracts and more flexible short-term contracts to raise the incentives to schooling and aggregate welfare.human capital, job destruction, matching frictions, efficiency

Employment Protection Reform in Search Economies

The design of employment protection legislation (EPL) is of particular importance in the European debate on the contours of labor market reform. In this article we appeal to an equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of EPL reform which reduces the red tape and legal costs associated with layoffs and introduces a U.S.-style experience- rating system, which we model as a combination of a layoff tax and a payroll subsidy. The reform considered shows that it is possible to improve the efficiency of employment protection policies without affecting the extent of worker protection on the labor market. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable, not only as an integral component of unemployment-compensation finance, as most studies acknowledge, but also as part and parcel of a virtuous EPL system.Search and Matching Models, Employment Protection, State-Contingent Layoff Tax, Experience-Rating

An Anatomy of the French Labour Market

[Excerpt] Over the last decades, many European countries have experienced high and persistent unemployment rates. The bulk of labour market research has tackled this issue by emphasizing the effect of employment protection legislation, hereafter EPL, on labour market performance. As a result, the importance of labour market flexibility has been widely acknowledged. This view can be summarized by the expressed desire of the E.U. council to give member States incentives to “review and, where appropriate, reform overly restrictive elements in employment legislation that affect labour market dynamics [...] and to undertake other appropriate measures to promote a better balance between work and private life and between flexibility and security”. It is however striking that most of the reforms undertaken have contrasted sharply with this latter recommendation by favouring reforms at the margin. Those reforms have fostered two-tier systems, as the increase in labour market flexibility has taken place mainly through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the use of fixed-term and/or non-standard employment contracts. Two-tier systems have promoted the emergence of dual employment protection which can be broadly defined as the coexistence of both long-term contracts, which benefit from stringent protection, and short-term contracts with little or no protection. It is often argued that this combination creates labour market segmentation, traps workers in a recurring sequence of frequent unemployment spells, favours unequal repartition of risk between workers and enhances inequalities. In particular, two-tier systems create excess labour turnover as they increase the incentives to create temporary rather than permanent jobs, reduce job destruction for stable jobs, but increase churning for temporary jobs. For instance in countries with stringent legal constraints on the termination of permanent jobs, such as France or Spain, it turns out that about 70 per cent to 90 per cent of entries into employment are in temporary jobs with very short duration (on average less than one month and a half in France). If excess labour turnover and its consequences are a concern for the economy as a whole, the dramatic spread of temporary jobs is even more a concern for young/less experienced workers as they are more likely to be negatively affected by the adverse effects of dual employment protection. The French labour market is no exception and has faced similar trends during the 1990s. Given the pervasiveness of temporary jobs on the labour market and their consequences on the society and economic outcomes, it is urgent to understand how two-tier systems shape the functioning of the labour market. This is the very purpose of the present report. After having described in details the salient features of the French dual labour market and having discussed the legislation at the root of French dualism, we review the different mechanisms through which dualism affect labour markets: labour market dynamics, wage inequality, human capital accumulation, job satisfaction, social integration and health. We consider whenever possible both theoretical insights and empirical evaluations. We finally conclude this report by providing possible directions to reform the labour market

Product market regulation, firm size, unemployment and informality in developing economies

This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on informality and unemployment in a general framework where formal and informal firms are subject to the same externalities, differing only with respect to some parameter values. Both formal and informal firms have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching friction in the labor market, and wages are determined through bargaining between large firms and their workers. The informal sector is found to be endogenously more competitive than the formal one. We find that lower strictness of product or labor market regulations lead to a simultaneous reduction in informality and unemployment. The difference between these two policy options lies on their effect on wages. Lessening product market strictness increases wages in both sector but also increases the formal sector wage premium. The opposite is true for labor market regulation. Finally, we show that the so-called overhiring externality due to wage bargaining translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.Informality; Product and Labor Market Imperfections; Firm Size

Product market regulation, firm size, unemployment and informality in developing economies

This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on informality and unemployment in a general framework where formal and informal firms are subject to the same externalities, differing only with respect to some parameter values. Both formal and informal firms have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching friction in the labor market, and wages are determined through bargaining between large firms and their workers. The informal sector is found to be endogenously more competitive than the formal one. We find that lower strictness of product or labor market regulations lead to a simultaneous reduction in informality and unemployment. The difference between these two policy options lies on their effect on wages. Lessening product market strictness increases wages in both sector but also increases the formal sector wage premium. The opposite is true for labor market regulation. Finally, we show that the so-called overhiring externality due to wage bargaining translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.Informality; Product and Labor Market Imperfections; Firm Size

Product Market Regulation, Firm Size, Unemployment and Informality in Developing Economies

This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on the number and size of firms in the formal and informal sectors, as well as on relative wages, relative size of the two sectors and overall unemployment. We show that entry costs in the formal sector tend to make informal firms smaller and more numerous than informal firms, i.e., such costs render the informal sector relatively more competitive. Furthermore, it is possible to reduce informality without increasing unemployment or reducing workers’ wage by reducing entry costs in the formal sector rather than reducing labor market regulations. We also highlight a number of externalities stemming from labor and product market imperfections, allowing the size of those distortions to differ across sectors. We show that, while the so-called overhiring externality takes place in both sectors, this translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.Informality, product and labor, market imperfections, firm size

Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm’s Matching Model?

In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm’s matching model of unemployment. We first show that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, we show that the differences between the three solution are weaker than expected. This contrasts with some of the main results obtained by the recent literature.appariement, négociations, jeux coopératifs.

Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d'appariement

Cet article s'intéresse aux effets liés à l'introduction d'un système de modulation des cotisations patronales à l'assurance chômage (ou experience rating) sur le niveau et la structure du chômage par qualification. Nous construisons pour cela un modèle d'appariement dans lequel l'évolution de la demande de travail, les décisions de création et destruction d'emplois, ainsi que l'évolution des taxes destinées à financer l'assurance chômage sont endogènes. Dans ce cadre, la protection de l'emploi a des effets qui peuvent être différenciés selon le niveau de qualification considéré. L'introduction d'un système de modulation des cotisations employeur à l'assurance chômage pourrait améliorer le fonctionnement du marché du travail; l'importance des éventuels effets indésirables liés à ce système dépend surtout de la capacité à substituer la taxe d'experience rating aux dispositifs de protection de l'emploi déjà en place

Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching Mmodel?

In this article, the authors use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. They apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm’s matching model of unemployment. To the best of their knowledge, this is the first attempt that has been made to implement and systematically compare these solutions in search matching economies. Their results are twofold. First from the theoretical/methodological viewpoint, they extend a somewhat flexible search matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, they prove that the Egalitarian and the Kalai -Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable and mathematically tractable within search-matching economies. Second, their results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in this context, they are generally qualitatively different and quantitatively weaker than expected. This is of particular relevance in comparison with the results established in the earlier literature.Search and matching models; Bargaining theory; Nash; Egalitarian; Kalai-Smorodinsky